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Abstract
Positioning and navigation problems have proven to be well-developed in all 
areas of the Earth (on the surface of the lithosphere and hydrosphere, in the 
atmosphere, troposphere and stratosphere), except the hydrosphere. This 
article is devoted to the problem of a analysis of the state of the underwater 
positioning and navigation and practically the undeveloped problem of the 
underwater navigation safety. Here we restrict ourselves to analyzing the 
possibility of transferring the well-established GNSS technology to the 
underwater world. Unfortunately, GNSS signals attenuate very quickly 
in water, thus all GNSS-like technologies are of the local nature, based 
on the transformation of the electromagnetic wave of GNSS signals into 
an acoustic wave. Therefore, we use the term LNSS (Local Navigation 
Satellite Systems) to refer to this underwater technology.
Keywords
GNSS, LNSS, Local Navigation Satellite Systems, Undersea LNSS, 
Jamming, Meaconing, Spoofing, Self-Spoofing, Spoofing Detection
For citation
Ochin E. Brief Analysis of GNSS and LNSS Vulnerabilities with the Focus 
on Spoofing for the Marine Autonomous Surface and Undersea Vehicles. 
Ural Radio Engineering Journal. 2020;4(2):167–187. DOI: 10.15826/
urej.2020.4.2.002.
Краткий анализ уязвимостей GNSS и LNSS 
с акцентом на спуфинг морских надводных 
и подводных автономных аппаратов
Е. Ф. Очин
Щецинский морской университет,  
Республика Польша, 70-500, г. Щецин, ул. Валы Хробрего, 1-2
 E.Ochin@AM.Szczecin.pl
Аннотация
Проблемы позиционирования и навигации хорошо зарекомендовали 
себя во всех областях Земли (на поверхности литосферы и гидросфе-
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ры, в атмосфере, тропосфере и стратосфере), за исключением гидросфе-
ры. Данная статья посвящена проблеме анализа состояния подводного 
позиционирования и навигации и практически неразвитой проблемы 
безопасности подводного плавания. Здесь мы ограничиваемся анали-
зом возможности передачи устоявшейся технологии GNSS в подвод-
ный мир. К сожалению, сигналы GNSS очень быстро затухают в воде, 
поэтому все технологии, подобные GNSS, носят локальный характер и 
основаны на преобразовании электромагнитной волны сигналов GNSS 
в акустическую волну. Поэтому мы используем термин LNSS (Локаль-
ные навигационные спутниковые системы) для обозначения этой под-
водной технологии.
Ключевые слова
ГНСС, ЛНСС, локальные навигационные спутниковые системы, под-
водная ЛНСС, джамминг, меконинг, спуфинг, самоспуфинг, обнару-
жение спуфинга
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1. Introduction 
GNSS [1–7] is the common name for the four Global Navigation 
Satellite Systems GPS (USA), GLONASS (USSR, RF), BeyDou-2 
(PRC), GALILEO (EU), the main purpose of which is the ground 
and air positioning, navigation and timing on land, in the sea and 
underwater of mobile vehicles at anytime, anywhere in the world.
RNSS is the common name for two Regional Navigation Sa-
tellite Systems
 NavIC (NAVigation with Indian Constellation), Government 
of India,
 QZSS (Quasi-Zenith Satellite System), Government of Japan, 
whose main purpose is the same as the GNSS goal.
Until 2016, NavIC was called IRNSS – Indian Regional Navi-
gation Satellite System. NavIC is an autonomous system designed 
to cover the Indian region and 1500 km around the Indian main-
land. The system consists of 7 satellites. 
QZSS operated by QZS System Service Inc. QZSS complements 
GPS to improve coverage in the East Asia and Oceania. The sys-
tem consists of 4 satellites and will be expanded up to 7 ones for 
autonomous capability by 2023.
GNSS pinpoint latitude, longitude and altitude to about 
a meter of accuracy and provide nanosecond precise time 
anywhere on the Earth.
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GNSS is a dual-use system: a standard civil location service 
(SPS) and a military precise positioning service (PPS). The access 
to PPS is controlled using cryptography and other information 
security methods. Since the material in this article is designated 
for the civil community, we will only consider SPS and when con-
sidering GNSS goals, we will mainly focus on GNSS positioning 
as the main goal of GNSS, without which it’s pointless to discuss 
the GNSS navigation and timing.
GNSSs are composed of three different complementary seg-
ments, as shown in Fig. 1:
Fig. 1. GNSS consists of three segments: the Space Segment,  
the Control (or Ground) Segment, and the User Segment
Рис. 1. GNSS состоит из трех сегментов: космический сегмент, 
управляющий сегмент и пользовательский сегмент
The Space Segment, consisting of navigation satellites, is a 
combination of sources of radio navigation signals that simulta-
neously transmit a significant amount of overhead information. 
The main functions of each satellite are the generation and emis-
sion of radio signals necessary for navigational determinations of 
consumers and the control of onboard satellite systems.
The Control Segment tracks and maintains the satellites in 
space. The control segment monitors the satellite health and it 
maintains the satellite orbits as desired. Furthermore, the control 
segment updates the satellite clock corrections and ephemerides, 
among other parameters, encapsulated in the navigation message. 
The control segment includes a cosmodrome, a command and mea-
surement complex and a control center. The spaceport provides the 
launch of satellites into the required orbits during the initial de-
ployment of the navigation system, as well as the periodic replen-
ishment of satellites as they fail or resource exhaustion. 
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The User Segment combines all user installations and their sup-
porting equipment. A custom installation typically consists of an 
antenna, a GNSS receiver, a processor, a computer, and I/O devi-
ces. the field of view, measures the propagation time of these sig-
nals and Doppler frequency shifts, converts them to pseudorange 
and pseudo range variation rates and determines the spatial posi-
tion and speed while setting the GNSS time.
To solve navigation problems, a specialized built-in computer 
is provided in the consumer equipment. The variety of existing 
consumer equipment meets the needs of land, sea, aviation, space 
etc. consumers (Table 1). 
Table 1. The GNSS application on land, above water, in the air 
and (most importantly and almost not developed) underwater 
(sorted alphabetically)
Таблица 1. Применение GNSS на суше, над водой, в воздухе 
и (что наиболее важно и почти не разработано) под водой  
(отсортировано по алфавиту)
Agriculture Power grids (hydro, heat, wind, solar)
Armament Search and Rescue
Building Space navigation
Banking systems (Online 





Cars, Trains Sea vessels)





Positioning and navigation problems have proven to be well-de-
veloped in all areas of the Earth (on the surface of the lithosphere 
and hydrosphere, in the atmosphere, troposphere and stratosphere), 
except the hydrosphere. This article is devoted to the problem of 
a brief analysis of the state of underwater positioning and under-
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water navigation and practically the undeveloped problem of the 
underwater navigation safety. Here we restrict ourselves to an-
alyzing the possibility of transferring the well-established GNSS 
technology to the underwater world. Unfortunately, GNSS signals 
attenuate very quickly in water, therefore all GNSS-like [8] tech-
nologies are of the local nature, based on the retransmission of 
the electromagnetic wave of GNSS signals into the acoustic wave
Hence, hereinafter we will use the term LNSS (Local Naviga-
tion Satellite Systems) to refer to this technology.
2. GNSS Vulnerabilities
When using GNSS, vehicle information protection is required. 
GNSS is vulnerable to Interference, Jamming, spoofing and self-
spoofing attacks (Fig. 2).
Fig. 2. The main GNSS Vulnerabilities
Рис. 2. Основные уязвимости GNSS
Here we do not consider the influence of Solar Activity and the 
related Atmospheric Effect on the GNSS accuracy, and do not con-
sider the Unintentional Interference (Industrial Electromagnetic 
Interference, Multipath and Jamming). We focus on the Intentio-
nal Interference, including
1. GNSS Jamming Attacks.
2. GNSS Meaconing Attacks1.
1 Meaconing can be considered as a special case of spoofing, however, in the 
literature it is usually allocated in a separate class due to the historical features 
of the use of this technology in electronic warfare.
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3. GNSS Spoofing Attacks.
4. GNSS Self-Spoofing Attacks [9].
The problem of dealing with jamming is well-developed. The 
most difficult type of attacks is spoofing. The spoofer can trans-
mit false signals from a distance of several tens or hundreds of 
meters from the victim. The spoofing can be divided into simple, 
intermediate, or complex attacks in terms of their effectiveness. In 
this article, we briefly look at Interference and Jamming, as well 
as the algorithms for detecting meaconing and Spoofing based on 
one or two receivers. We also overview briefly the issues of anti-
meaconing and anti-spoofing. 
Fig. 3. GNSS Spoofing. Spoofing interferes with the structure of GNSS 
transmission and deliberate modification of the receiver’s route. This 
is a terrorist, information attack involving the use of original data 
from a reliable source of information to fraudulent customer security 
by sending distorted or false data in its place
Рис. 3. Спуфинг GNSS. Спуфинг изменяет структуру передачи 
данных GNSS и преднамеренно модифицирует маршрут 
пользователя. Это террористическая информационная атака, 
включающая использование оригинальных данных из надежного 
источника информации для преодоления безопасности клиентов 
путем отправки на их место искаженных или ложных данных
GNSS signals have low power, which means that a weak source 
of interference can cause the receiver to fail or create dangerous-
ly misleading information. So far, the biggest concern for GNSS 
has been its possible jamming by masking the satellite signal with 
noise. The complete loss of GNSS is fairly easy to detect, but bare-
ly noticeable movements due to jamming can seem like spoofing, 
which can be very difficult to detect.
Spoofing is more insidious: a false signal from a ground station 
that simply knocks down the satellite receiver. For simplicity, jam-
ming leads to the death of the receiver, and forgery – to the fact 
that the receiver is lying. However, as explained below, this state-
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ment is not technically correct, but it provides a broad overview 
of what the main difference between interference and spoofing is.
2.1. Why GNSS is relatively easily affected by vulnerabilities
The qualitative analysis shows that the radiation energy of the 
satellite’s transmitting antenna significantly decreases when ap-
proaching the Navigator’s receiving antenna (Fig. 4).
Fig. 4. The radiation flux density decreases with the distance 
from the satellite
Рис. 4. Плотность потока излучения уменьшается 
с удалением от спутника
The energy that electromagnetic waves carry over time is dis-
tributed over a larger and larger surface (Fig. 5). The quantitative 
analysis shows that the energy transmitted through the surface of 
a single site (shown in blue in Fig. 5) per unit time, i.e., the ra-








t t R  
(1)
consequently, the study flux density decreases inversely with the 
square of the distance to the satellite’s antenna.
Fig. 5. The radiation flux density decreases with distance 
from the satellite in inverse proportion to the square of the distance 
to the satellite’s antenna
Рис. 5. Плотность потока излучения уменьшается с расстоянием 
от спутника обратно пропорционально квадрату расстояния 
до антенны спутника
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If we take into account that the GNSS orbits are at altitudes of 








∆ π∆  
(2)
This means that the radiation flux density upon reaching the navi-
gator’s antenna decreased 400 trillion times! From here we make 
an exceptional first important conclusion.
With the help of a primitive jammer at the cost of tens of dol-
lars, any uneducated terrorist can suppress the GNSS operation 
within a radius of several tens of meters. If you need to increase 
the range of the jammer to several tens of kilometers, you will 
have to pay several thousand dollars, unless, of course, military 
jammers are sold to you. 
2.2. Why {GNSS + INS} partially block vulnerabilities
The exceptional second important conclusion is as follows. To 
ensure the safe piloting of autonomous vehicles, GNSS should be 
viewed as an aid to positioning and navigation. Wherever possi-
ble, we should equip our unmanned vehicles with INS, etc.
An inertial navigation system is a navigation device that 
uses motion sensors to continuously track the position, 
orientation, and speed of a vehicle without the need 
of external links.
The application of microelectromechanical systems (MEMS) in INS 
is of particular significance for commercial unmanned vehicles.
Several types of INS have been developed for maritime, air 
and land applications. A number of ground moving objects have 
odometrical coordinate systems based on counting the number of 
revolutions of a standard wheel. The information on the covered 
distance is obtained by the odometer, and information on the di-
rection is obtained by the gyroscope. If the tool starts from a 
known position, then the information about the distance and di-
rection can be used to determine the position at any time. Being 
an environment-independent system, INS provides the same high 
accuracy as GNSS, but for a short time after initialization. Mo- 
reover, INS provides high-speed data updates comparable to 
GNSS. The main disadvantage of INS is that they accumulate an 
invalid positioning error over long time intervals.
The combination of GNSS and INS overcomes 
the limitations of both systems.
Concluding the introduction, we would like to pay attention to 
Fig. 6, which shows the main focus of this article.
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Fig. 6. Two closely related classes of GNSS problems
Рис. 6. Два тесно связанных класса проблем GNSS
The devil is not so terrible as he is painted – it’s about 
jamming and spoofing. If the “Spoofing Detection” subsystem 
has detected an attack, the processor will switch the 
navigation to the INS subsystem and if the GNSS “signal 
loss time” and the corresponding accumulated error are valid 
for these INS, then it will return to GNSS navigation.
3. Classification of Marine Unmanned Vehicle
Unmanned Vehicles appeared in the late 80s. DARPA1 pioneered 
this technology. To broaden its horizons, DARPA created the bien- 
nial AUV conference. However, even at present, the terminolo-
gy associated with the design and use of marine unmanned vehi-
cles (MUV) still requires significant systematization, therefore in 
this article we use the following basic abbreviations, designations, 
terms and their definitions (Fig. 7 and Table 2), which the author 
has collected and systematized from various sources (111, etc.).
Fig. 7. Classification of Marine Unmanned Vehicles
Рис. 7. Классификация морских беспилотных аппаратов 
1 https://www.darpa.mil/ (Accessed: 17 July 2020)
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Table 2. Main abbreviations, designations, terms and their definitions
Таблица 2. Основные сокращения, обозначения,  






The infrastructure for providing the mission for marine un-
manned vehicles, representing the combination of marine 
unmanned vessels, manned support vehicles, support base 
stations, telecommunications facilities, etc.
Support Base 
Station (SBS)
The Support Base Station (SBS) is the ground and /or sur-
face part of MUVS, ensuring the execution of the mission 





Marine Unmanned Vessels (MUV) is a surface or submarine 
vessel that does not have a command on board and is capable 
of performing MisUV autonomously using an on-board com-





The Given Route (GR) of a MUV is the route of a MUV on 
the water surface and/or underwater from one 3D point of 
the sea to another 3D point of the sea through open areas 
of the sea and/or narrowness (straits, channels, rivers and 
lakes). The GR forms the SBS. 
The Mission 
of a UV 
(MisUV) 
The Mission of a UV (MisUV) is the precise preprogrammed 
trajectories of a MUV on the water surface and/or underwa-
ter from one 3D point of the sea to another 3D point of the 
sea through open areas of the sea and/or narrowness (Straits, 
channels, rivers and lakes). The MUV forms the SBS as pre-
planning of all MUV courses based on the study of the navi-
gation situation along the mission using lots, large-scale sea 




The navigation padding is a continuous control of the MUV 
movement using an onboard computer with maximum pro-




Remotely Operated Vessel (ROV) is a MUV that is capable of 




Surface Remotely Operated Vessel (SROV) is a surface ROV 
that is capable of performing MisUV via remote control of 




Surface Remotely Operated Vessel (SROV) is an undersea 
ROV that is capable of performing MisUV by remote con-





Autonomous Undersea Vessel (AUV) is a MUV that is 
capable of performing MisUV autonomously using an on-
board computer and maneuvers  in three dimensions.
Surface AUV 
(SAUV)
Surface Autonomous Undersea Vessel (SAUV) is a surface AUV 
that is capable of performing MisUV autonomously using an 




Undersea Autonomous Undersea Vessel (SAUV) is an under-
sea AUV that is capable of performing MisUV autonomous-
ly using an on-board computer and maneuvers  in three di-
mensions. 
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Among the many UVSs (Fig. 7) in this article, we limit our-
selves to considering only the Marine Unmanned Vehicle System 
(MUVS). Table 2 helps to understand the abbreviations, designa-
tions and terms.
The main problem of the classification is that, on the one hand, 
it is important to preserve the well-established abbreviations, des-
ignations, terms and their definitions, and on the other hand, it 
is important to adhere to the general principles of object classi-
fication. Hopefully, we managed to find a middle ground in this 
difficult search.
4. Underwater navigation
Omitting many important historical and engineering details, 
we consider the basic technologies of underwater LNSS positio- 
ning and LNSS navigation.
The simplest satellite positioning technology is the LNSS based 
on the popup tethered GNSS antenna (Fig. 8a). This technology is 
used to refine the {x, y} coordinates (the {z} coordinate is calcu-
lated based on a water pressure sensor and knowledge of the sea 
level altitude). The navigation problem is solved with the antenna 
towing or the Inertial Navigation System (INS).
      
 a b 
Fig. 8. LNSS Position: a – based on popup tethered GNSS antenna,  
b – based on tethered Disposable Radio-Acoustic Transponder
Рис. 8. LNSS-позиционирование: а – на основе всплывающей 
привязанной антенны GNSS, б – на основе привязного одноразового 
радиоакустического транспондера
At greater depths, the use of the cable becomes difficult and 
one has to use the LNSS technology based on Tethered Disposable 
Radio-Acoustic Transponder (Fig. 8b). The Transponder can be 
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tethered from an UAUV or installed from a ship or aircraft. In 
this case, navigation is only possible with INS1.
The underwater navigation [8; 10–12] has become widespread as a 
complex of technologies, which in the literature are usually described 
together – Short Baseline (SBL) (Fig. 9a), Ultra-Short Baseline (USBL) 
(Fig. 9b), and Long Baseline (LBL) (Fig. 9c). These three technolo-
gies have a lot in common, but, of course, they differ significantly.
    
 a b c
Fig. 9. a – Short Baseline (SBL), b – Ultra-Short Baseline (USBL), c – 
Long Baseline (LBL). The positions of each acoustic transmitter are 
specified in geographic coordinates using GNSS or (for SBL and USBL) 
in relative coordinates, for example, relative to the center of the 
support vessel as {0,0,0}
Рис. 9. а – Короткая базовая линия (SBL), б – Ультра-короткая 
базовая линия (USBL), c – Длинная базовая линия (LBL). 
Положение каждого акустического передатчика указывается 
в географических координатах с использованием GNSS или (для 
SBL и USBL) в относительных координатах, например, относительно 
центра судна поддержки как {0,0,0}
They are similar in the following parameters. Here, the tri-
lateration method, well studied in geodesy, is used. Determining 
the location of the {x, y} of undersea UAUV is based on measur-
ing the distances (ranges) from the acoustic transmitters to the 
hydrophone of the Vessel in terms of the speed and propagation 
time of acoustic waves. If the range of up to three acoustic trans-
mitters is measured and their coordinates are known the coordi-
nates of the vessel’s position may be determined.Due to the dif-
ferent accuracy of the “clocks” on the acoustic transmitters and 
in the hydrophone and some other reasons, the distances deter-
mined by the acoustic transmitters may be defined with an error. 
This erroneous distance is called “pseudo-range”. If we omit the 
1 An inertial navigation system (INS) is a navigation device that uses a 
computer, motion sensors (accelerometers) and rotation sensors (gyroscopes) to 
continuously calculate by dead reckoning the position, the orientation, and the 
velocity (direction and speed of movement) of a moving object without the need 
for external references.
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problem of error analysis, then we can write a system of equations 
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x x y y D
x x y y D
x x y y D
 − + − =
 − + − =
 − + − =  
(3)
where Di, 1,3i =  – the measured distances up to three (Fig. 8) acous-
tic transmitter, {xi, yi} 1,3i =  – the known coordinates of three 
acoustic transmitters, {xv, yv} – the unknown coordinates of UAUV.
The solution to the system of equations (1) is the calculated co-
ordinates of UAUV (4):
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The coordinates {xv, yv, zv} of UAUV are estimated if the depth’s 
calculation is added to the geographic coordinates using measured 
water pressure, i.e. {zv} = f(water pressure). 
Without binding to GNSS, if the origin is as {xv, yv, zv} = {0, 0, 0}, 
i.e. bind to some point of the supply vessel, then the natural depth 
of immersion is {zv} = 0 at time t = 0.
Many hydroacoustic synchronous rangefinder navigation sys-
tems are also known. Examples include the Norwegian HiPAP from 
Kongsberg, the French GAPS from IXBLUE, as well as the huge 
contribution to these technologies by the American Teledyne, the 
German EvoLogics.de, the English Sonardyne, of course Ameri-
can DARPA (Fig. 10) and many others.
Fig. 10. DARPA program plunges into underwater positioning systems
From https://newatlas.com/darpa-underwater-navigation/43472/  
(Accessed: 17 July 2020)
Рис. 10. Программа DARPA по системам подводного позиционирования
Источник https://newatlas.com/darpa-underwater-navigation/43472/  
(Доступ: 17 июля 2020 г.)
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5. GNSS-equipped Intelligent Buoys (GIB)
GIB provides real-time absolute coordinates, speed and trajec-
tory of the movement of submarines, divers, remotely controlled 
underwater vehicles, autonomous manned and unmanned under-
water vehicles. Based on the GIB, LNSSs are implemented, which 
can be classified as LBL acoustic positioners. GNSS-equipped In-
telligent Buoys can be drifting or moored. The number of GIBs 
is determined by the size of the controlled area and the positio-
ning accuracy.
We consider one of the many options for constructing an LNSS 
based on the GIB, indicated in Fig. 11 as the Disposable Radio-
Acoustic Transponders.
Fig. 11. LNSS Navigation based on three Disposable Radio-Acoustic 
Transponders of type GIB (Disposable Radio-Acoustic Transponders)
Рис. 11. LNSS-навигация на основе трех одноразовых 
радиоакустических транспондеров типа GIB (одноразовые 
радиоакустические транспондеры)
The navigation satellite is a transmitting radio station with 
known {x, y, z} coordinates, which emits directional radio signals. 
The radio receiver of a GIB measures Δt – the Time of Arrival (TOA 
or ToA, and also ToF – the time of flight) of the radio signal from 
the satellite to the radio receiver and determines the distance to 
it ρ = c · Δt, where is the speed of electromagnetic waves propaga-
tion, approximately equal to the speed of light c ≈ 300,000 km/s.
In the general case for N satellites (the positioning accuracy in-
creases with the increase in the number of the “visible” satellites)
2 2 2{ ( ) ( ) ( ) ,}, 1,i i v i v i vx x y y z z i Nρ = − + − + − −∆ρ =  (5)
where xi, yi, zi – the known coordinates of the i-th satellite that the 
i-th satellite transmitted to the vehicle; xv, yv, zv – the unknown 
coordinates of the vehicle V; ρi – measured pseudorange from the 
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i-th satellite to the vehicle V with the unknown error Δρ, which 
is the same for all satellites; N – the number of “visible” naviga-
tion satellites.
To solve the system of equations (5), relatively complex itera-
tive algorithms are used to calculate {xv, yv, Δρ}, consideration of 
which is beyond the scope of this article.
Suppose LNSS Navigation is built on three UAUV of the GIB 
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 − + − =
 − + − =
 − + − =  (6)
where Di, 1,3i =  – measured distances up to three (Fig. 8) GIB, 
{xi, yi} 1,3i =  – known coordinates of three GIBs, {xv, yv} – un-
known coordinates of UAUV.
The solution to the system of equations (6) is the calculated 
coordinates UAUV (7):
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 1 2 3 2 3 2 3 3 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
3 2 1 2 2 1 2 3
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 1 2 3 2 3 2 3 3 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
3 2 1 2 2 1 2 3
( )
( )( ) ( )(
( ) ( )( )
( )( ) (
)
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y y x x y y x x
x x D D y y x x x x D D y y x x
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x x y y x x y y
− − − + − + − − − − + − +
=
− − − − −
− − − + − + − − − − + − +
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The coordinates {xv, yv, zv} of UAUV are estimated by adding the 
depth calculation to geographic coordinates using measured water 
pressure, i.e. {zv} = f(water pressure). 
6. Underwater spoofing 
Omitting many extremely important engineering details, let’s 
move on to the main topic of this article – the safety issue of LNSS 
underwater navigation [13–24]. 
The spoofer (Fig. 12) enters the UAUV area of responsibi-
lity quietly, “listens” to GIBs, calculates its own coordinates 
{xS, yS, 0}. In underwater mode, the spoofer calculates its depth 
{zS} = f(water pressure) and gets its coordinates {xS, yS, zS}. Lis-
tening to UAUV noises, the spoofer determines the bearing and 
distance to UAUV and estimates the target coordinates { ,  , }v v vx y z  .
Next, the spoofer processor solves the inverse problem (8)
2 2 2
1 1 1 1
2 2 2
2 2 2 2
2 2 2
3 3 3 3
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ,
( ) ( ) ( )
v x v y
v x v y
v x v y
x x y y D d
x x y y D d
x x y y D d
 − + ∆ + − + ∆ = +
 − + ∆ + − + ∆ = +







where {Δx, Δy} – the desired UAUV offset that can be achieved by 
introducing appropriate delays Δti for the GIB signals (9)
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∆ =  
(9)
where c is the speed of sound in water (for the given frequency).
Fig. 12. The Spoofing of LNSS Navigation based on three Disposable 
Radio-Acoustic Transponders of type GIB
Рис. 12. Спуфинг LNSS-навигации на основе трех одноразовых 
радиоакустических транспондеров типа GIB
Further, the spoofer uses acoustic radiation directed at the 
UAUV of increased power compared to the power of acoustic sig-
nals from the GIBs. As a result, UAUV “switches” from real GIB 
signals to fake spoofer signals and solves the already “fake” sys-
tem of equations (7)
2 2 2
1 1 1 1
2 2 2
2 2 2 2
2 2 2
3 3 3 3
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ,




x x y y D d
x x y y D d
x x y y D d
 − + − = +
 − + − = +
 − + − = +  
(10)
where {Di + di}, 1,3i =  – measured distances up to three (Fig. 8) 
“false” GIBs, {xi, yi} 1,3i =  – known (unmodified by the spoofer) coor-
dinates of the three GIBs, {xv, yv} – unknown coordinates of UAUV.
The solution to the system of equations (10) is the calculated 
“false” coordinates UAUV (11).
2 2 2 2 2 2
2 1 2 2 3 3 2 3 2 3
2 2 2 2 2 2
3 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2
3 2 1 2 2 1 2 3
2 2 2 2 2 2
2 1 2 2 3 3 2 3 2 3
2 2 2
3 2 1 1 2 2 1 2
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( )( ) (
) )
( )(( ) ( ) )
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x x D d D d y y x x
x x D d D d y y
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− + − + − + − + −
− − + − + − + − +
=
− − − − −
− + − + − + − + −

















 − − − − −      
(11)
The further development of the spoofing strategy depends on many 
factors. Here we stop in believe that the main idea of the under-
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water LNSS vulnerability in the form of an underwater spoofing 
attack is clear to the reader.
7. Spoofing detection 
If the spoofer is stationary and UAUV is moving in a certain 
direction at the speed V, then the spoofing detector, located on 
board the UAUV, at the time t′  determines its coordinates { , }v vx y′ ′  
in accordance with (3) and (4), adds the calculated depth using 
the measured water pressure, i.e. { } (  )vz f water pressure=′  and gets 
the coordinates { , , }v v vx y z′ ′ ′  of UAUV. After some time the spoofing 
detector repeats the determination of its coordinates { , , }v v vx y z′′ ′′ ′′ .
7.1. The spacing between two positions of UAUV in navigation mode
The measured distance Δd between the hydrophone at the times 
t′  and is t′′ (12)
2 2 2( ) ( ) ( ) .v v v v v vd x x y y z z∆ = − + − + −′ ′′ ′ ′′ ′ ′′  (12)
This Δd must be commensurate with the distance Δd covered by 
the vehicle over time Δt, i.e.:
( ).d V t t∆ ≈ −′′ ′  (13)
7.2. The spacing between two positions of UAUV in spoofing mode
The measured distance Δd between the hydrophone at the times 
t′  and is t′′ (14)
2 2 2( ) ( ) ( ) 0,v v v v v vd x x y y z z∆ = − + − + − ≈′ ′′ ′ ′′ ′ ′′  (41)
since all the hydrophones in the spoofing zone calculate the same 
false coordinates and should be commensurable with the distance 
Δd travelled by the vehicle over time ( )t t−′′ ′  over time ( )t t−′′ ′ , i.e.:
( ).d V t t∆ << −′′ ′  (15)
7.3. The decisive rule
Comparing equations (9) and (12), the decisive rule for detect-
ing spoofing can be written as (16): 
( )if d V t t∆ << −′′ ′  then go to Spoofing. (16)
The main disadvantage of this spoofing detection method is 
the spoofing dead zone {V < Vmin}, i.e. if UAUV stands still or 
moves at a low speed less than some experimentally determined 
speed Vmin, then spoofing cannot be detected. To overcome this 
disadvantage, it is necessary to have two hydrophones on the 
UAUV hull, spaced as far as possible D1 – 2 (for example, at the 
stern and at the stem).
In this case, UAUV can stand still or move at any speed. The 
spoofing detector determines its coordinates using the first hydro-
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phone { , }v vx y′ ′  in accordance with (3) and (4), adds the calculated 
depth using the measured water pressure, i.e. { } (  )vz f water pressure=′  
and gets the coordinates of { , , }v v vx y z′ ′ ′  UAUV. At the same time, the 
spoofing detector determines its coordinates using the second hy-
drophone { , }v vx y′′ ′′  in accordance with (3) and (4), adds the calculated 
depth using the measured water pressure, i.e. { } (  )vz f water pressure=′′  
and gets the coordinates { , , }v v vx y z′′ ′′ ′′  of UAUV.
The measured distance between hydrophones should be com-
mensurate with the actual distance between hydrophones in nor-
mal UAUV operation (17) 
2 2 2
1 2( ) ( ) ( )v v v v v vd x x y y z z D −∆ = − + − + − ≈′ ′′ ′ ′′ ′ ′′  (17)
and approximately equal to zero in spoofing attack mode (15)
2 2 2( ) ( ) ( ) 0.v v v v v vd x x y y z z∆ = − + − + − ≈′ ′′ ′ ′′ ′ ′′  (18)
Comparing equations (17) and (18), the decisive rule for detec-
ting spoofing can be written as (16):
0if d∆ ≈  then go to Spoofing. (19)
where “≈” refers to the definition of some area of uncertainty Δdmin, 
determined on the basis of statistical studies at the design stage 
of a real detection system.
8. Simulation of the underwater LNSS
Initially, when the UAUV is launched from a support vessel, 
it travels down a spiral path before reaching operating depth 
(Fig. 13). At this point it is necessary to localize the UAUV to help 
calibrate the INS (if the UAUV has such equipment). Then UAUV 
performs the assigned mission and returns to the base.
Fig. 13. Subsea LNSS Simulation
Рис. 13. Моделирование подводной LNSS
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The basic techniques, which are used to solve the problem of 
spoofing detection above water, can also be used under water. Since 
conduction of physical experiments underwater is incomparably 
more complex task than surface experiments, at this stage of re-
search we tested the principles of underwater spoofing detection 
using a simulation approach. We are planning to devote the next 
article “The Modelling and Simulation of the Undersea LNSS Vul-
nerabilities” to the problems of modelling UAUV trajectories in 
complex, including under-ice conditions.
9. Conclusion
The trend towards the melting of Arctic ice has led to the pros-
pect of creating new sea routes and perhaps more important po-
tential access to natural resources under the Arctic Ocean. Many 
countries have shown unusual activity in collecting bathymetric 
data to determine their sovereign Arctic territory. 
Therefore, in conditions of fierce competition in the 
development of the Earth’s hydrosphere, it is necessary not 
only to design the UAUV, but also to ensure safe sea diving.
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